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III.
A.

ARGUMENT

The State's Assertion that Appellant did not Marshal the
Evidence is Both Without Merit and not Properly Before the
Court.
1.

Appellant's Recitation of Facts Fairly and Accurately
sets Forth All Facts upon Which the Jury Could Have Based
its Decision.

The claim that Appellant did not marshal the evidence is
incorrect.

The State claims Appellant

"defendant's
. . . ."

arrangement

with

Br. Appellee, at 14.

Tim

failed to explain that

Markham

was

month-to-month

Appellant specifically set forth

that fact in footnote 1 of his initial Brief.

The State next

contends Appellant did not include the fact that, "defendant paid
no rent for December 1995 or January 1998."

Id.

However, as the

State notes earlier in its Brief, "Defendant did not pay . . . and

does

not

claim

to have paid,

January

1996."

claims

Appellant

for

the months

of December

Br. Appellee, at 10 (emphasis supplied).
ignored

the

fact

that

disappeared for two or three months . . . "

Mr.

1995

or

The State

Hawkins,

"just

Br. Appellee, at 14.

Appellant clearly stated, "[Mr. Hawkins] seemed to disappear near
the end of October."

Br. Appellant, at 9.

The State asserts

Appellant ignored an exchange between Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Severns
stating: "at the time, defendant asked Severns what he was doing
there, a question that Severns found unusual."

Br. Appellee,

at 15u

Mr.

Appellant

Hawkins

specifically

referenced

asked Mr. Severns what

this same exchange:

he was

Mr. Severns asked the same of Mr. Hawkins."

doing

there, and

Br. Appellant, at 10.

Finally, the State argued Appellant ignored the admission that
Mr. Hawkins "entered both units and . . . 'did what I had to do.'"
Br. Appellee, at 15.
"Defendant

admits

Again, it is the State that recognizes,

he

Br. Appellee, at 20

entered

the

units

around

(citing Br. Appellant, at 32) .

4

a.m."

Thus, the

State's contention that Appellant ignored or overlooked these facts
is an unfair characterization.
The remaining four facts the State claims were ignored are
either

irrelevant

discussion

or

between

false.
Gloria

For

example,

Markham

and

the

Jack

State

cites a

Carlton

where

Mr. Carlton said he might know who took the Markhams' tools.
Appellee, at 15.

This evidence could support a finding that Mr.

Hawkins entered the units and that he committed the theft.
course,

Mr.

Br. Appellee,

Hawkins
at

Br.

admits

20, and

to

theft

entering

the

property,

Of
see,

is not an issue on appeal.1

Accordingly, Mr. Carlton's thoughts about whom he suspected in the

'Although Mr. Hawkins denied having stolen any property, he
chose not to appeal the conviction for theft because there was some
evidence supporting that Count.
-2-

theft is irrelevant.

The State also cites Mr. Markham's comment

that Mr. Hawkins "evicted himself by not showing."
at 14.

Br. Appellant,

That comment is a legal conclusion and an incorrect legal

conclusion, and what Mr. Markham considered to be the state of the
law at the time of the trial is irrelevant.

The State also notes

that after the theft occurred, Mr. Hawkins lied to the investigating

officer.

That

assertion

has

no

bearing

on

whether

Mr. Hawkins committed an unlawful entry.
Finally, the State's claim that Mr. Markham changed all the
locks is untrue.

A cursory review of the facts set forth in the

State's Brief shows that Mr. Markham did not change either lock on
Unit

98.

Each

Unit

had

Tr. Vol. 1, at 101, 195.

an

outside

and

an

overhead

door.

The State notes that Tim Markham was

unable to change the lock securing the side door to Unit 98.
Br. Appellee, at fn. 5.

The State also note's,

u

[b] ecause some

rollers were missing from the overhead door of unit 98, Tim Markham
used vise grips to lock the door from the inside."
at 4.

The State's own version of the facts establishes that

condition existed on the night in question.
147-78.

Br. Appellee,

The

State's

own recitation

of

the

Tr., Vol. 1, at
facts

shows

that

Mr. Markham did not change the lock on the side door and did not

-3-

change

the

locking

system

on

the

overhead

door.

Therefore,

Mr. Markham did not change either of the locks on unit 98.
suggestion that the exclusion of that "fact"

The

was somehow improper

is erroneous because the assertion is untrue.
2.

The State's Marshaling Argument is not Properly Before
the Court.

The

Court

should not

consider

the merits of

the

State's

marshaling "argument" because it is not presented properly.

Utah

Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b) requires the Brief of Appellee to
conform with Rule 24(a)(9).

That Rule requires Appellee to state

its contentions and the reasons supporting its position.
that Rule, Utah Appellate

Courts have consistently

Under

refused

to

consider argument when a party fails to offer sufficient analysis
and authority in support of its position.

State v. Wareham. 772

P.2d 960, (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah
1988); State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v.
Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, n.l (Utah App. 1996); State v. Streeter, 900
P.2d 1097, n.3 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566,
n.3 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah App.
1992); State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991); State v.
Cayer, 814 P.2d 604, 613 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Steraer. 808
P.2d 122, n.2 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Pascoe. 774 P.2d 512, n.l
-4-

(Utah App. 1989); Cf.

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818

P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991) (a party cannot present a laundry list
of the evidence and leave for the court the burden of determining
what facts are relevant to satisfy its burden to marshal) (citing,
Heinecke v. Dept. Of Commerce, 810 P. 2d 459 (Utah App. 1991)).
driving force behind the rule is that
entitled
authority

to

have

cited

the

and

issues

is not

clearly

simply

n

The

[a] reviewing court is

defined

with

a depository

pertinent

in which

the

appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research."
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450.
Here, the State's two conclusions and a list of ten citations
to the record do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(b) because
they leave the burden of argument with the Court.

The State's

^argument" that Appellant did not marshal literally consists of 1)
a statement that Appellant did not marshal, 2) a list of ten things
it claims Appellant did not cite in his brief, and 3) a recitation
that Appellant did not marshal.
no argument.
portions

Br. Appellee, at 14-15.

There is

The State does not explain why or even whether those

of the record

could have been remotely

important

or

whether the jury could have based its conclusion on those facts.
In sum, the claim that Appellant failed to marshal is not supported

-5-

by any legal reasoning or analysis and, therefore, does not conform
with Rule 24(b).
B.

The Markhams
Interest.

did

not

Terminate

Mr.

Hawkins'

Leasehold

At trial, and now on appeal, the State failed to offer facts
which would

have been

legally

necessary

in order

to

reach a

conclusion that Mr. Hawkins' leasehold interest had terminated
prior to when the alleged crime occurred.

Moreover, the Markhams

acted in a manner that was inconsistent with the suggestion that
they intended to terminate the Lease.
1.

The Facts as Alleged by the State do not Support a Legal
Conclusion that the Markhams Terminated Mr. Hawkins'
Lease.

The facts elicited at trial are legally insufficient to show
the Markhams terminated Mr. Hawkins' Lease.

Once a person is

granted permission to enter a property, an unlawful entry can occur
only if that permission is revoked.

People v. Barefield, 804 P.2d

1342, 1345 (Colo. App. 1990) (citing People v. Carstensen, 420 P.2d
820 (Colo. 1966)) . Mr. Hawkins had a lawful right to enter because
he had a Lease which was never terminated.
argue

the

Lease

granted

privilege to enter.

Mr.

Hawkins

the

The State does not
license,

right

and

The State argues that at some point prior to

when the alleged crime took place the Lease had terminated, thereby
-6-

revoking Mr. Hawkins7

license

to enter.

This argument

fails

because the Markhams' acts and omissions were insufficient as a
matter of law to terminate the Lease.
The facts the State cites in support of its argument do not
support
Mr.

its

Hawkins'

conclusion.
actions

are

First,

the

misplaced.

State's

The

State

reliance

on

supports

its

argument with the facts that Mr. Hawkins 1) did not pay rent 2) was
not forthright with the police when confronted, 3) did not claim
his right to enter was based on the Lease when questioned by the
police, and (4) did not claim his right to enter was based on the
Lease when he testified at trial.
these facts is irrelevant.

Br. Appellee, at 15-16.

Each of

Only the Markhams had the authority to

exclude Mr. Hawkins from the property.

What Mr. Hawkins did, or

did not do, as a matter of law, could not

infringe upon the

Markhams'

property.

exclusive

right

to

control

their

reliance on Mr. Hawkins' actions is inappropriate.

Thus,

Furthermore,

the existence of the Lease depends exclusively on the events which
occurred

before

the

entry.

What

happened

after

the

fact

is

irrelevant.
The

only

other

facts

the

State

cites

in support

of

its

position are, 1) Mr. Markham changed the locks and re-rented the

-7-

space, and 2) the Lease automatically expired when Mr. Hawkins
"disappeared." Id.

Reliance on these u facts" is improper because

they do not exist as evidence in this case.
not change the locks as the State claims.
supra.

First, Mr. Markham did
See, section III(A)(1),

Second, it does not follow from the record that the Lease

automatically terminated.
"you pay you stay.

The terms of the Lease agreement were,

You don't you go."

Tr., Vol. 1, at 136, 169.

The record is clear that Mr. Hawkins was never timely with his
rent.

According to Mr. Markham, Mr. Hawkins paid, "a little bit

here and there, you know."

Tr., Vol. 1, at 157.

"[Mr. Hawkins]

was supposed to be renting [unit 98], but you know, whether I got
it or whether I didn't get it; I would chase him around until the
15th or 20th of the month trying to get money out of him, you know."
When

asked

if

Mr.

Hawkins

Mr. Markham responded,
Tr., Vol. 1, at 16 9.

made

the

rent

payment

as

agreed,

" [a] s far as I know he made a couple."
Mr. Hawkins was chronically late with his

rent, if he made it at all.

The record does not suggest anyone

considered the "you pay you stay" Lease terminated simply because
Mr. Hawkins was untimely with rent.

Accordingly, the State's

conclusion that Mr. Hawkins' late rent automatically terminated the
Lease is not reasonably based in the evidence.

-8-

In this case, the record shows the Markhams did not evict
Mr. Hawkins or

inform him

Br. Appellee, at 17.

in any way that he was unwelcome.

The record also shows the Markhams did not

retake the property, remove Mr. Hawkins' belongings from the units
or take any other action to put Mr. Hawkins on notice his Lease was
terminated.

In short, the record offers no support to the State's

claim that the Markhams terminated the Lease agreement they had
with Mr. Hawkins.
2.

Markhams Elected to Leave Mr. Hawkins in Possession of
the Property Rather than Terminate the Lease.

Contrary to what the State suggests, the Markhams did not
terminate Mr. Hawkins leasehold interest.

Instead, at worst for

Mr. Hawkins, the Markhams treated the Lease as modified

to a

storage arrangement so they could charge Mr. Hawkins storage fees.
Between November

1,

1995

and

at

least

January

29, 1996, the

Markhams charged Mr. Hawkins rent for the use of the units to store
Mr. Hawkins' property.

State's Exhibit 8.

On January 29, 1996,

Gloria Markham wrote Mr. Hawkins a letter explaining that she was
charging Mr. Hawkins a storage fee of $16.00 per day for storing
his belongings in the units.
November
Mr.

1,

Hawkins

1995,
or

and

Mr.

Id.

were

Carlton

to

Those charges began accruing on
continue

removed
-9-

Mr.

until

such

Hawkins'

time

as

remaining

possessions.

As of January 29, 1996, Mr. Hawkins had a storage

bill of $1,440.00.

That sum includes a $16.00 fee for the date the

alleged crimes occurred.
The Markhams were faced with a decision when Mr. Hawkins did
not pay rent for December 1995 and January 1996: evict Mr. Hawkins
from the property and lose the right to collect rent or, let
Mr. Hawkins store his property in the units and charge him a
storage fee.

They unequivocally chose the later.

The benefit the

Markhams wanted was $16.00 a day for rent. The burden they accepted
was to grant Mr. Hawkins the license to access his property.
Simply because the Markhams became unhappy with their bargain is
not sufficient justification to ignore the legal consequence of
their choice.
By treating the Lease as one for storage the Markhams did not
divest Mr. Hawkins of his license to enter.

At best, the election

changed the nature of the agreement from one where Mr. Hawkins used
the shops to perform auto-body repair to one where Mr. Hawkins used
the space to store and access his belongings for a lesser fee.

By

changing the nature of the Lease, Mr. Hawkins still had a lawful
right to access his property which was stored in the units, and, as

-10-

noted

above,

the

license

and

privilege

to

enter

were

never

otherwise terminated.
C.

The Markhams did not Restrict the Scope of Mr. Hawkins'
License to Enter as the State now Contends.

The State does not contest the Markhams' invitations gave
Mr. Hawkins a lawful right to enter units 98 and 99.

Rather, the

State argues Mr. Hawkins' entry was unlawful because his entry
somehow exceeded the scope of his license to enter.
the State, when the Markhams told Mr. Hawkins to
shit," the Markhams

xx

Mr.

return

Hawkins

could

xx

[c] ome get your

intended" and Mr. Hawkins "understood" that
to

the

complex

only

during

business hours" and under the Markhams supervision.
at 17.

According to

xx

normal

Br. Appellee,

There are no facts upon which such inferences could have

arisen.
The State's reasoning is based on the false premise that the
record supports a finding that any restrictions ever existed.

In

order to sustain a burglary conviction on the theory that the
accused committed an unlawful entry by exceeding the scope of his
license or privilege to enter, the State must affirmatively prove
the scope of the license and how it was exceeded.

State v. Harper,

785 P.2d 1341 (Kan. 1990), People v. Rider, 307 N.W.2d 690 (Mich.

-11-

1981),

People v. Woolsey, 322 N.E.2d 614

(111 1975), State v.

Starkweather, 297 P. 497 (Mont. 1931).
In Woolsey,

for

example,

the

defendant

was

charged

committing a burglary of the warehouse were he worked.
322 N.E. 2d, at 614.

with

Woolsey.

Defendant argued he could not have committed

an unlawful entry because he was an employee with a key to the
warehouse and, therefore, had license and privilege to enter.
at 615.

Id.

In support of its case the State showed that employees

were authorized to enter the warehouse only during business hours
as defined by the company.

Id. at 615.

The only exception to that

rule was if an employee worked past closing time, he could enter
the warehouse to return a vehicle or materials.
alleged

crime,

all

employees

were

required

warehouse early because of bad weather.
have been working past closing.

On the day of the
to

return

to

the

Accordingly, no one would

The warehouse later closed at 5:00

p.m. and no employees would have had reason or authority to enter
the warehouse

until

the next

day.

Thereafter,

entered the warehouse and committed a theft.

the

defendant

The Court affirmed

the conviction, holding that "the evidence in the instant case does
support the conclusion that defendant's authority to enter the
Gersman and Company building was limited to those occasions -- both

-12-

time and purpose
activities."

-- where necessary to further the employee's

Id. at 617.

There is no analogous showing in this

case; the employee was not leasing space in the warehouse or
storing his property there for a fee and Mr. Hawkins was not an
employee of the Markhams nor subject to their supervision.
In this case, the State's argument that Mr. Hawkins' entry
exceeded the scope of the permission fails for two reasons.

First,

the State failed to offer sufficient evidence establishing that any
limitations were placed on Mr. Hawkins' entry.

Second, even if

these limitations existed, the State failed to offer any evidence
defining the scope of the limitations.
The State apparently argues Mr. Hawkins' license to enter the
complex was limited to "business hours" when the Markhams were
present.

Br. Appellee, at 17.

evidence

those

restrictions

However, the record contains no

exist.

Certainly

no

one

told

Mr. Hawkins he could enter only during "business hours," nor did
anyone tell Mr. Hawkins he could remove his belongings only under
the Markhams' supervision.
implied,

that

restriction.

Indeed, there is no evidence, stated or

the Markhams

wanted

or

even

considered

such a

Examination of the record in this case shows the only

place where such restrictions are mentioned is in State's brief.

-13-

Furthermore, even if the State had established Mr. Hawkins was
allowed to enter only during ''business hours," the State did not
show, and indeed does not even attempt to show, what
hours" where.

"business

If the State now wants to argue its case based on

the premise that Mr. Hawkins' license was limited to "business
hours" the State carries the burden to prove when business hours
were.

It did not do so and there is no evidence upon which such a

showing can be made.

The State did not offer any evidence to

establish when "business hour" were; therefore, it cannot prevail
on a theory that Mr. Hawkins entered the complex outside of those
hours.
The

State's

suggestion

that

Mr.

Hawkins

entered

outside

"business hour" is further undercut by the record showing either
there were no "business hours" or "business hours" were unlimited.
Mr. Markham worked in the units "seven days a week if he had to"
and at times would stay "until after midnight."
at 147.
If

he

Tr., Vol. 1,

Furthermore, he allowed Mr. Hawkins to "just come and go.
was

there,

he

Tr., Vol. 1, at 13 8.

was

there.

If

he

wasn't,

he wasn't."

Mr. Markham also testified Mr. Hawkins often

stayed through the night at the shop.

-14-

Id.

The only reasonable

inference is there were no defined "business hours" at the shop, or
that all hours were "business hours."
The Markham did not evict Mr. Hawkins, did not tell him he was
no longer welcome, did not change the locks, and did not remove
Mr. Hawkins' belongings from the property.

The Markhams did,

however, charge Mr. Hawkins rent for using the units to store his
property and repeatedly urged and invited Mr. Hawkins to the units
to remove that property.

Assuming Mr. Hawkins removed some of

Mr. Markhams' property along with his own would make Mr. Hawkins a
thief, but not a burglar.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, and those set forth in Appellant's Opening
Brief, the conviction for burglary should be overturned.
DATED this [7^_

day of April, 1998.
Attorneys for Appellant
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